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TOO BIG TO ARBITRATE? CLASS ACTION WAIVERS, ADHESIVE 




Access to arbitration provides a simple, expeditious, and “feasible form of fairness 
in adjudication.”1 In avoiding the typically tedious and strenuous litigation procedures, 
arbitration remains “a vital part of the litigation alternatives in the [United States] legal 
system.”2 However, what happens when one side, particularly the poorer and weaker party, 
unwillingly or unknowingly submits to an alternative legal path that hinders their chances 
of success, fairness, or justice? 
Class action procedures allow courts to manage lawsuits that would otherwise be 
impossible or improbable if each class member were required to join as an individually 
named plaintiff.3 The process “enables vindication of claims that otherwise could never be 
litigated, no matter how meritorious.”4 Antitrust lawsuits, for example, typically provide 
access to class actions for consumers or employees, and represent the primary way to 
compensate victims who suffer a loss, while subsequently providing a strong deterrent to 
future illicit behavior.5 In the age of global marketing, communication, and access to 
information, “it is not uncommon for many individuals to be harmed in essentially identical 
ways by mass-produced products or standard corporate practices.”6 Class actions attempt 
to level the playing field for those groups otherwise economically disadvantaged or lacking 
access to the justice system.7 
Over the years, however, large corporations have begun to routinely opt to use 
arbitration agreements to prevent class action lawsuits through class action “waivers” 
 
* Matt Rubinoff is a J.D. candidate at Penn State Law, class of 2021, and a Managing Editor of the Penn 
State Arbitration Law Review. 
 
1 Thomas E. Carbonneau, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (4th ed. 2017).  
 
2 Id. at 2. 
 
3 Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States, in DEBATES 




5 See Joshua Paul Davis, Antitrust data reveals vital role of private actions, illustrates need to pass FAIR 





7 See id. (“[W]hen claims are brought together in class action form, the aggregate amount may be large 
enough to make it possible to engage the services of equally skilled counsel”).  
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imbedded in their contractual agreements.8 These waivers too often remain hidden or 
unseen to the final user of the product or employee of the company until after they have 
already agreed to the contract.9 Accordingly, parties seeking a cause of action are not only 
forced to arbitrate any dispute, but also are prevented from certifying the lawsuit in a class 
action proceeding.10 
 This article discusses class action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements and 
examines their possible impact on access to antitrust violation claims. Part II introduces 
the recent history of class action waivers and the United State Supreme Court’s continued 
enforcement of such waivers. Part III addresses the impact of case law on antitrust laws 
and procedures. Finally, Part IV concludes with recent developments, and what the near 
future might look like for mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
 Arbitration settles legal disputes in a functional, flexible procedure, avoiding the 
unneeded expenses and delays of a common judiciary.11 On a macro level, arbitration 
represents a justifiable avenue to not only avoid backing up the court system with claims, 
but also expediates the process for legitimate parties seeking relief.12 From this perspective, 
the goals of arbitration inherently seek to support litigants who do not have the time or 
money to compete with a powerful opposition. However, as the Supreme Court, as well as 
the legislature, increasingly relies on the enforcement of arbitration agreements, the bigger, 
stronger parties strategically use customized adhesive arbitration contracts and class-action 
waivers as a protective shield to further benefit themselves and effectively limit any future 
liabilities.13 
(a) The Federal Arbitration Act 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “in response to 
widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”14 Originally proposed as “special 
 
8 See Megan Leonhardt, Lawmakers want to give Americans back their right to sue companies, CNBC 
(Sept. 10, 2019, 5:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/10/lawmakers-want-to-give-americans-back-
their-right-to-sue-companies.html (“A recent academic study found that 81 of the biggest 100 companies in 
America have put legal clauses in the fine print of their customer agreements that bar consumers from suing 
them in federal court…”).  
 
9 See id. 
 
10 See id. 
 
11 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 5. 
 
12 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 
13 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 12 (Noting that from the perspective of a business, “[they] see 
arbitration as a means of avoiding judicial procedures that favor the interest of the weaker party and . . . 




interest legislation,” the New York State Chamber of Commerce helped lobby the bill in 
an effort to secure federal legislation related to arbitration agreements and to support the 
recently enacted New York state arbitration laws.15  
In its final form, the FAA validated agreements to arbitrate and solidified the notion 
that contractually submitting disputes to arbitration did not violate public policy.16 Today, 
armed with the support of the Supreme Court, the FAA shields arbitration agreements at 
“every stage and aspect of the arbitral process.”17 Moreover, due to the federalization of 
arbitration law, the Supreme Court routinely uses the FAA to strike down state laws or 
state court decisions that do not support the enforceability of valid arbitration agreements.18 
(b) Major Expansions in Adhesive Arbitration 
Mandatory or adhesive arbitration represents the most controversial aspect of 
domestic arbitration law.19 Over the years, the Supreme Court’s continued validation of 
adhesive arbitration agreements and class action waivers has ignited public discontent.20 
Traditionally, the process pits commercial parties against the common individual.21 
Inherently, companies seek to avoid litigation, especially class action lawsuits, because of 
the unnecessary costs, time, and potential negative publicity.22 On the other side of the 
aisle, advocates for class action believe the process remains essential to fairness and social 
justice.23 Consequently, about a decade ago, the Supreme Court further solidified its 
position in favor of arbitrability, as well as the FAA’s inherent power to pre-empt state 
laws concerning the invalidation of arbitration agreements. 
 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (“Concepcion”), plaintiff consumers brought suit 
against AT&T in federal district court as part of a class action alleging AT&T engaged in 
 
14 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 
15 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 103. 
 
16 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 104. 
 
17 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 63. 
 
18 See Robert Marcelis, US Supreme Court Tells Lower Courts to Enforce Arbitration Agreements, JURIST 
(Feb. 16, 2013, 5:00 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2013/02/robert-marcelis-arbitration-
agreement/ (“[Concepcion represents] the watershed case in the Court’s repudiation of state laws that work 
to invalidate arbitration agreements). 
 
19 See id. 
 
20 See id. (“While plaintiffs in years past could use state laws to invalidate arbitration agreements, the US 
Supreme Court recently restricted the viability of these challenges”).  
 
21 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 73. 
 
22 See Marcelis, supra note 18. 
 




false advertising and fraud.24 The district court denied AT&T’s motion to compel 
arbitration, citing the Discover Bank rule, which permitted voiding arbitral clauses that 
contained class action waivers in adhesive consumer transactions.25 The district court 
further reasoned that because the class action waivers prevented consumers from pursuing 
their proper right to recover, the arbitration provision was unconscionable.26 After the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed.27 
 Led by Justice Scalia in the majority, the Supreme Court held that the FAA pre-
empts any state law that goes against the intentions of the federal statute.28 No matter how 
justified the state public policy, the Court reasoned that the California state law applied 
disproportionately to arbitration agreements.29 In the eyes of the Court, and in their 
expansive interpretation of Section 2 of the FAA, the California law conflicted with the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.30  
 Following Concepcion, the Supreme Court continued to support the exclusion of 
class action relief through adhesive class action waivers.31 This time, the controversy pitted 
federal arbitration laws against federal antitrust laws.32 In American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant (“Italian Colors”), the plaintiff merchants entered into an agreement 
with a subsidiary of American Express.33 The contract included a class action waiver.34 
 
24 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333. 
 
25 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 184-85 (2005) (holding class action arbitration 
waivers generally unenforceable in consumer contracts); see Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333; see also 
Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 151 (“The so-called Discover Bank rule generally voided arbitral clauses that 
contained class action waivers in the setting of adhesive consumer transactions”). 
 
26 See id. 
 
27 See id. at 334-35. 
 
28 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341 (“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type 
of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA”). 
 
29 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 234 (“By voiding a long-standing California decisional approach on 
the matter . . . and upholding the class waiver provision, the Court reasserted the hegemony of the federal 
law and policy on arbitration and eliminated any doubt about the current direction of American arbitration 
law”). 
 
30 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 35. (“As a general rule, courts uphold arbitration agreements no matter 
what their deficiencies in formation might be”).  
 
31 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. (“Italian Colors”), 570 U.S. 228, 228 (2013). 
 
32 See id. at 231 (“According to respondents, American Express used its monopoly power in the market for 
charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than the fees for 
competing credit cards. This tying arrangement, respondents said, violated §1 of the Sherman Act. They 
[also seek] treble damages . . . under §4 of the Clayton Act”).  
 
33 See id. 
 




Nonetheless, following a dispute, the plaintiffs filed a class action claiming defendant 
American Express violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and portions of the 
Clayton Act.35 As part of their antitrust claim, the plaintiffs sought the applicable treble 
damages.36 American Express moved to compel arbitration.37 In response, the plaintiffs 
argued that the costs of individual arbitration greatly exceeded their total potential 
recoveries.38  
After the district court granted the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the 
lawsuits, the Second Circuit reversed, holding the class action waiver unenforceable 
because of the unbalanced costs directed onto the plaintiffs.39 However, once again led by 
a Justice Scalia majority, the Supreme Court reversed.40 The Court held that the FAA does 
not permit courts to invalidate a class arbitration waiver solely because of the costs 
involved in the process exceed the total potential recovery.41 Moreover, the Court reasoned 
that the existing antitrust laws do provide any intention to preclude class action waivers 
such as the one in the plaintiffs’ case.42 For better or for worse, in the eyes of the Supreme 
Court, the FAA now not only ruled over state law and state courts, but also pre-empted 
otherwise legitimate recovery under federal antitrust laws. 
 
(c) Epic Systems: Another Clash of Federal Laws 
Finally, the most recent case that the Supreme Court heard regarding class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements followed a dispute within an employment contract.43 In 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (“Epic Systems”), the plaintiff employees sued their 
employers regarding a wage-and-hour disputes in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.44 The employment contracts contained class action waivers, and noted any dispute 
 
35 See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 231. 
 
36 See id. at 231-32. 
 
37 See id. 
 
38 See id. 
 
39 See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 232. (“[B]ecause of the prohibitive costs respondents would face if they 
had to arbitrate, the class-action waiver was unenforceable and arbitration could not proceed”). 
 
40 See id at 239. 
 
41 See id. (“The regime established by the Court of Appeals’ decision would require . . . that a federal court 
determine . . . the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and . . . the cost of 
developing that evidence. . . . Such a preliminary litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect 
of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure”).  
 
42 See id. at 232. 
 
43 See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (“Epic Systems”), 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (2018). 
 
44 See id. 
213 
 
must be arbitrated on an individual basis.45 In response to the suit, the defendant employer 
filed a motion to compel arbitration.46 The district court granted the motion, citing the 
superseding powers of the FAA.47 The Ninth Circuit reversed, claiming the “savings 
clause” of the FAA allowed for an exception to such agreements.48  
The Supreme Court consolidated this case with two other petitioned cases that 
created a circuit split in deciding how the FAA and National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) interacted.49 Upon granting certiorari, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
valiant effort to once again curb the enforceability of adhesive arbitration agreements.50 
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Gorsuch led the majority in holding class action waivers 
enforceable under the FAA.51 Balancing the language between the NLRA and FAA, the 
Court sided with the latter, reasoning that Section 7 of the NLRA does not require class 
action availability in any way.52 The court also reasoned that the FAA’s “savings clause” 
in Section 2 does not apply here, but rather arbitration agreements may only be invalidated 
by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”53  
Although the Court held in favor of upholding arbitration agreements and 
increasing the federal powers of the FAA, the Court concluded its opinion with an open 
invitation for Congress to clarify the confusion as it relates to the competing laws.54 Until 
 
 
45 See id. at 1619. 
46 See Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
 
47 See id. 
 
48 See id. at 1622 (“By its terms, the saving clause [in Section 2 of the FAA] allows courts to refuse to 
enforce arbitration agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract’”). 
 
49 See Stephanie Greene and Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court Endorses 
Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements - #TimesUp on Workers' Rights, 15 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 43, 
45-46 (2019). 
 
50 See Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 
51 See id. at 1632 (“The policy may be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that 
arbitration agreements like those before us must be enforced as written”). 
 
52 See id. at 1628 (“[T]his Court’s Section 7 cases have usually involved just what you would expect from 
the statute’s plain language: efforts by employees related to organizing and collective bargaining in the 
workplace, not the treatment of class or collective actions in court or arbitration proceedings”). 
 
53 Id. at 1622. 
 
54 See id. at 1632 (“While Congress is of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing 





then, the Court believed they could, at this moment, “easily read Congress’ statutes to work 
in harmony….”55 
(d) The Post-Epic Systems World 
The Epic Systems decision reignited an already tense debate on the status of class 
action waivers and mandatory arbitration clauses, and their possible detrimental effects on 
the working public.56 In the almost two years since the 2018 ruling, lower court decisions 
have just started to show the lasting impact of the Court’s unwavering support for enforcing 
adhesive arbitration clauses.57 Notably, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals have already addressed the remnants of the Court’s decision in 
Epic Systems.58 As expected, early case decisions show strong, continued judicial support 
for the enforcement of class action waivers, even when class action proceedings result in a 
valid award for plaintiffs.59 Though decidedly settled in the current judicial system, 
removal of access to class action remains a contentious issue in the debate around 
arbitration clauses, especially as it relates to existing federal antitrust laws. 
 
III. THE ANTITRUST LANDSCAPE IN AN ADHESIVE ARBITRATION WORLD 
(a) Land of the Free, Home of the Lawsuit 
Much of the conversation around mandatory arbitration agreements and the 
inclusion of class action waivers has to do with the perceived fight between the strong and 
the weak.60 David versus Goliath; the little consumer or employee versus the large 
corporation. As the Supreme Court continues to support the enforceability of adhesive 
 
55 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 
56 See Grace O’Malley, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: Singled Out by Corporations and a Textualist 
Supreme Court, American Workers Are Left to Fend For Themselves, 78 MD. L. REV. 635, 658-68 (2019). 
 
57 See Irma Reboso Solares, Considerations for Use of Arbitration Agreements to Curtail Class Claims, 
THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (July 21, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/considerations-use-
arbitration-agreements-to-curtail-class-claims. 
 
58 See id. 
 
59 See id. (noting a Seventh Circuit case which reversed a district court’s decision to strike down a waiver 
clause forbidding class arbitration, even though the resulting class litigation resulted in a $10 million 
arbitration award against the employer). 
 
60 See Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 12 (“In consumer transactions (especially) and non-union employment 
relationships . . . the economically stronger and better-positioned party imposes the obligation to arbitrate 




arbitration agreements, concerns as to the rights of workers and consumers come front and 
center in the debate.61 
Historically, Americans have always loved lawsuits.62 Any one citizen’s access to 
the court system provides for a sense of individual power, freedom, and the innate ability 
to right a wrong. Recently, however, the frequency of class action lawsuits has trended 
downward.63 On the heels of Epic Systems, according to publicly available data, “2019 
marked the first year in more than a decade that there were fewer federal class action 
lawsuits alleging unpaid wages, job discrimination, and mishandled retirement benefits.”64 
Further, the Economic Policy Institute estimates that by 2024, around eighty-three percent 
of private sector workers, nearly ninety-five million people, will be forced to resolve 
disputes through adhesive arbitration agreements.65 
Those in favor of adhesive arbitration agreements suggest that the pre-determined 
adjudication procedure brings “efficiency and economy to the marketplace for all its 
participants.”66 While it is true that arbitration allows for quicker processing and award 
determinations compared to lagging judicial procedures, the theory does not consider the 
elimination of access to the marketplace for some of those participants.67 Similar to 
discouraged workers no longer factoring into a society’s estimated unemployment rate, 
sometimes the elimination of previous market actors prevents us from seeing the forest for 
the trees.68 Accordingly, this analogy is an apt comparison to the state of adhesive 
arbitration and its effects on antitrust laws and litigation. 
 
(b) Mitsubishi and the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
 
61 See Stephanie Greene & Christine Nylon O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for Mandatory 
Arbitration After Epic Systems, New Prime, and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 815, 816-22 (2019); 
Christopher Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 266-69 (2015). 
 
62 See Alex Berezow, Blame And Claim: Can We Fix America's Uniquely Litigious Culture?, AMERICAN 
COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH (Dec 28, 2019), https://www.acsh.org/news/2019/12/27/blame-and-
claim-can-we-fix-americas-uniquely-litigious-culture-14477 (“[T]he United States has more lawsuits per 
100,000 people than similar countries”).  
 
63 See Andrew Keshner, The number of workers suing their employers fell last year for the first time in 16 




64 Keshner, supra note 63. 
 
65 See id. 
 
66 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 236. 
 
67 See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Article, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110 
NW. U.L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2015). 
 




 In 1985, the Supreme Court attempted to peacefully mediate the differences 
between the enforcement of arbitration laws and antitrust violations. In Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. (“Mitsubishi”), the Court held that claims under 
American antitrust laws, as they relate to international agreements, may be submitted to 
arbitration so long as the agreement includes a valid arbitration clause.69 The Court 
reasoned that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function.”70 However, the Court also noted a plaintiff has the opportunity to show 
that the arbitral forum does not fully vindicate his or her rights, and upon that showing, a 
court may hold the arbitration agreement unenforceable and permit the plaintiff’s pursuit 
of the claim in federal court.71  
Following Mitsubishi, this “effective vindication doctrine” provided an out for 
antitrust claimants who believed their cases were not suited for an arbitral forum, whether 
or not they signed a mandatory and adhesive agreement.72 Following this decision, for 
example, courts used the doctrine to invalidate class action waivers, as well as provisions 
that prevented an arbitrator from awarding the appropriate treble damages under an 
antitrust claim.73 For nearly three decades, courts struck a harmonious balance between 
enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA and allowing valid antitrust claims to 
proceed in federal court when necessary or otherwise “vindicated.”74 This balance, 
however, ultimately tipped well in favor of arbitration enforceability in Italian Colors. 
As described above, Italian Colors held in favor of enforceability of arbitration 
agreements under the FAA, and that the federal laws do not support the invalidation of a 
class arbitration waiver solely because the costs involved in the process exceed the total 
potential recovery.75 The plaintiffs’ arguments included citing the effective vindication 
doctrine, claiming that the costs from mandatory individual arbitration proceedings, such 
as finding and preparing expert witness testimony, significantly prevented their rights to 
proper antitrust remedy in the form of class action adjudication.76  
In dismissing these claims, the Court dismantled the credibility of the effective 
vindication doctrine, describing the doctrine as dictum.77 Without this practical safeguard, 
 
69 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (“Mitsubishi”) v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 636-38 (1985). 
 
70 Id. at 637. 
 
71 See id. at 652 n.19. 
 
72 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 8-10. 
 
73 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 8-10. 
 
74 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 9-11. 
 
75 See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 232. 
 




scholars suggest the post-Italian Colors world leaves “potential antitrust defendants . . . 
more likely to use arbitration clauses to substantially reduce the probability of antitrust 
liability and the amount of damages recovered by successful antitrust plaintiffs.”78 
Enforcing class action waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses prevents plaintiffs from 
accessing traditional antitrust litigation, and confers significant disadvantages to 
defendants.79 
 
(c) The FAIR Act: A Viable Solution? 
On September 6, 2019, the American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) submitted a letter 
to Congress in support of the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act.80 Joined 
by ten other organizations, the letter urged Congress to pass the bill aimed at invalidating 
contract provisions mandating individual arbitration in antitrust disputes.81 While it is still 
uncertain if the bill will ever be signed into law, its backing from different institutional 
groups shows a strong message in support of the public’s right to access class action 
litigation.82 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s continued support for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements following Concepcion, Italian Colors and Epic Systems, 
corporations remain unregulated and free to violate antitrust laws while insulated from 
private lawsuits through forced class action waivers.83 The FAIR Act attempts to combat 
these actions and “restores the ability of consumers, workers, and businesses to effectively 
vindicate their Sherman and Clayton Act rights.”84 
According to the 2018 Antitrust Annual Report, “private antitrust lawsuits settled 
in federal courts since 2013 have recovered $19.3 billion on behalf of victims of antitrust 
 
77 See id. at 235 (“The ‘effective vindication’ exception to which respondents allude originated as dictum . 
. . where we expressed a willingness to invalidate . . . arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’”).  
 
78 Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 13. 
 
79 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 13. 
  
80 See American Antitrust Institute, AAI Leads Call for Congress to Restore Victims’ Antitrust Rights by 
Ending Forced Arbitration, (2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Antitrust-FAIR-Act-Letter-9.6.19-.pdf.  
 
81 See Davis, supra note 5. 
 
82 See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, The House just passed a bill that would give millions of workers the 
right to sue their boss, VOX (Sept 20, 2019, 11:30am), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/20/20872195/forced-mandatory-arbitration-bill-fair-act (“Members 
of Congress have been trying for years to outlaw forced arbitration in various scenarios: for sexual 
harassment and discrimination claims and consumer complaints. None have ever gotten through the House, 
so passage of the FAIR Act is a major milestone”).  
 
83 See Davis, supra note 5. 
 




violations….”85 Compelling arbitration and encouraging the use of class action waivers 
provides for various serious harms to antitrust laws and potential plaintiffs, including: (1) 
diminishing the amount of class actions in general, which are necessary to the function of 
antitrust laws; (2) preventing antitrust plaintiffs from receiving certain procedural 
advantages; and (3) harming antitrust plaintiffs whose right to class actions are needed the 
most.86 
First, class actions represent a significant portion of antitrust victims’ lawsuits and 
facilitate the enforcement of antitrust laws.87 Research conducted by the AAI shows that, 
over the two decades prior to Italian Colors in 2013, “private antitrust enforcement led to 
the recovery of at least $33.8 billion in damages….”88 Private enforcement through class 
action not only provides for a major part of compensating the victims of antitrust violations, 
but also represents “the principal financial deterrent against future anticompetitive 
abuses.”89 Without the ability for victims to aggregate and seek relief for damages, 
violators of antitrust laws are therefore shielded from any responsibility or motivation to 
alter their practices.90 As the AAI noted, without access to class action proceedings, 
“antitrust violations often will go uncompensated, under-deterred, or altogether un-
remedied.” 91 
Second, compelling arbitration prevents antitrust plaintiffs from seeking certain 
procedural advantages, such as treble damages, forum selection, limitations on appeals 
from the arbitrator, and possible attorney’s fees.92 Compared to arbitration proceedings, 
antitrust litigation includes extensive discovery, which is critical to the case’s outcome.93 
Although this reduces costs in the end, the condensed discovery proceedings significantly 
benefit the defendants.94  
Moreover, arbitration agreements often have pre-decided limits on remedies, 
usually buried in the arbitration clause at issue.95 In antitrust litigation, however, the 
 
85 Davis, supra note 5 (noting in 2018 alone, antitrust settlements totaled five billion dollars). 
86 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80.  
 
87 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
88 American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
89 American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
90 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 37-38 
 
91 American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
92 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 13-14. 
 
93 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 15. 
 
94 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 15 (“[Given the advantages to employers using adhesive 
employment agreements], a corporate attorney arguably would commit malpractice if she failed to advise a 
client to employ class action waivers in such contracts”).  
 
95 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 15-16. 
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plaintiff is entitled to treble damages and the judge has no discretion.96 Trebling damages 
serves to deter antitrust violators, adequately remedy victims, and encourage private 
enforcement of antitrust laws.97 Consequently, forced arbitration removes many of the 
advantages provided to antitrust plaintiffs in bringing their initial suit, and transfers powers 
over to both the arbitrator of the case and the drafters of the original arbitration clause.98 
This provides another significant advantage to the defendant and severely limits the 
effectiveness of federal antitrust laws, particularly in cases where the plaintiff may 
involuntarily or unknowingly agree to submit to arbitration. 
Finally, mandatory arbitration and class action waivers remove antitrust rights from 
the individuals who may need it the most.99 Since Concepcion, class action waivers 
imbedded into arbitration agreements have grown in popularity within consumer products 
and service contracts.100 In the years after Epic Systems, the same can be argued with regard 
to non-compete or anti-competitive clauses in employer contracts.101 The rise of class 
action waivers in these agreements ultimately destroys private antitrust rights for “the most 
vulnerable economic actors in the [United States].”102 Because class action antitrust claims 
involve “high-volume, low-dollar frauds and price fixing” schemes, individual claims are 
small or invaluable in comparison to the costs of prosecuting an antitrust case.103 Therefore, 
absent access to class action proceedings, individual claimants who do not have the 
resources to pursue a claim may avoid taking action all together.104  
For example, if a worker or consumer is forced to arbitrate a claim against a 
company, the costs associated with travel, attorneys, and other expenses may not be worth 
the estimated recovery.105 The individual’s rights to a remedy are thus deprived because of 
the inability to aggregate the claim.106 Moreover, in an employee-employer claim, the 
 
 
96 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 22. 
 
97 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 22-24. 
 
98 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 67, at 22-24. 
 
99 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
100 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80 (noting 39.5% of employers adopting mandatory 
employment arbitration did so following 5 years after Concepcion, and 41.1% of employees covered by 
adhesive arbitration also submit to class action waivers). 
 
101 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80 (arguing corporate attorneys will have no option but to 
advice corporate clients to include class actions waivers for the protection of their business). 
 
102 American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
  
103 American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
104 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
105 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
 
106 See American Antitrust Institute, supra note 80. 
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worker is not only ill-equipped to challenge the company individually, but also risks giving 
up benefits associated with his or her current employment status.107 The last thing an 
employee may want to do in an employment dispute is bother or aggravate an employer 
through an individualized claim, putting their own reputation at risk if the lawsuit does not 
work out in their favor.108  
In addition to up front costs of litigation without access to an aggregated claim, the 
risk of litigating against an employer may also harm crucial existing benefits to the 
employee, such as affordable health care or other essential family-related benefits covered 
by the employer.109 As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent of Italian Colors, “[n]o rational 
actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring 
costs in the hundreds of thousands.”110 In the end, between the increased costs of litigation 
procedures and loss of potential employment benefits, the American worker remains 
arguably the “worst equipped of all to take on powerful firms without a claims aggregation 
device.”111 
Similarly, a small business relying on larger suppliers for goods may be reluctant 
to bring a claim on its own, without access to aggregating the claims.112 The business risks 
involved with bringing an individual claim against a powerful supplier or manufacturer 
likely favors non-pursuit, especially if the business relies on the existing business 
relationship.113 Without access to class action, the growth of waivers and support of 
mandatory arbitration agreements leaves antitrust violations open to an unchallenged 
market.114 Not only does this harm the effectiveness of antitrust laws, but also enables 
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larger corporations to easily exploit loopholes in their tailored agreements of sale or 
employment contracts.115 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR PUBLIC OR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
As we enter a new decade, the future of adhesive arbitration and access to class 
action litigation remains uncertain. On January 15, 2020, the Eastern District of New York 
revisited a portion of Italian Colors, because the lawsuit continues to move through the 
federal court system.116 Here, this portion of the lawsuit “challenged non-discrimination 
provisions in American Express ‘card acceptance agreements’ that barred merchants from 
steering customers toward less costly payment methods, such as cash or cards that take a 
smaller cut of each transaction.”117 The defined class of plaintiffs included merchants that 
accept American Express cards at their businesses.118 Unsurprisingly, the court sided with 
American Express and granted their motion to compel arbitration to the specified class of 
the merchant plaintiffs.119 At this time, the court noted, there is simply “no way around 
Italian Colors.”120  
In further support of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Italian Colors, the district 
court judge also rejected any arguments relating to the effective vindication doctrine, 
calling the argument “nonsensical.”121 The district court reasoned that any notion of a 
remedy of class-wide injunctive relief did not exist when the legislature enacted the 
Clayton Act.122 
On one side, some suggest there “appears to be a tacit understanding between the 
Court and . . . Congress that arbitration falls within the Court’s exclusive bailiwick.”123 On 
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the other, the Court in Epic Systems seemingly does the opposite, pointing out that 
Congress is “always free to amend this judgment.”124 Similar to two baseball players 
chasing down a fly ball, this “I got it, you take it” communication between branches 
prevents any real progress and encourages a stalemate for as long as no one takes notice. 
A bold assumption here would be that, at some point, one side will take responsibility for 
their inherent power to address public concerns. Unfortunately, the continuing deferral of 
authority implies a satisfaction with the status quo. Subsequently, until further notice, the 
situation remains strongly in favor of enforcing class action waivers as well as any and all 
valid arbitration agreements. 
Notably, though, there remains a small light at the end of the tunnel. Recently, 
pushback from the public – as well as state legislatures – may play a roll in re-engaging 
the rights of consumers and employees.125 Some companies, such as Google and Facebook, 
have even “bowed to employee pressure and dropped their arbitration clauses . . . in the 
case of sexual harassment claims.”126 Also, in the past year, California and Virginia joined 
New York and Washington as the handful of states banning forced arbitration 
agreements.127 These prohibitions, in addition to the FAIR Act passing the House of 
Representatives, represent a good start to the decade for opponents of the current 
interpretation of the FAA.128  
In an ideal world, the democratic pressures of consumers, workers, state 
legislatures, and even an open invite from a Supreme Court, could lead to real changes to 
the FAA. Reality, however, may have other plans. Between uncontrollable political factors 
within a shifting administration, Congress, and judiciary, we are all left to wait and see 
whether change is possible, or if those in power continue to drop the ball. 
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